THE ANGLO-SAXON *DREAMS:*
THE SEMANTIC SPACE OF *SWEFNIAN* AND *MÆTAN*[1]

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ABSTRACT

The present paper intends to construct the semantic space of the Old English verbs for 'to dream' from a functional-lexematic perspective. A first proposal will be the inclusion of *swefnian* and *mætan* in specific lexical domains. Secondly, the syntactic alternations based on case marking and their semantic relationship will establish the possible differences between the two verbs. Finally, the cognitive component allows for an attempt to connect the old and the modern *dreams.*

KEY WORDS: *Actionsart*, dream (dream, rejoice), FLOED (Functional Lexematic Old English Dictionary), Image Schematic Model, lexical domain, logical structure, *mætan*, *swefnian*.

RESUMEN

Este ensayo tiene como objetivo presentar desde una perspectiva lexemático-funcional el espacio semántico de los verbos que en inglés antiguo designan el concepto de 'soñar'. Una primera propuesta será la inclusión de *swefnian* y *mætan* en dominios léxicos específicos. En segundo lugar, las alternancias sintácticas basadas en la marca de caso y su relación semántica nos llevarán a establecer posibles diferencias entre los dos verbos. Por último el componente cognitivo permitirá intentar conectar el verbo *dream* del inglés antiguo con el *dream* del inglés moderno.

PALABRAS CLAVE: *Actionsart*, soñar, alegrarse, diccionario nuclear sintáctico de base semántica del léxico del inglés antiguo, modelo esquemático de imagen, dominio léxico, estructura lógica, *mætan, swefnian*.

1. INTRODUCTION

The *Oxford English Dictionary* (*OED*) states that the word *dream* under-
stood as "a train of thoughts, images, or fancies passing through the mind during
sleep; a vision during sleep; the state in which this occurs" is only registered at the
beginning of the Middle English period, therefore quoting as a first example one
from *Genesis and Exodus* in 1250. In the Old English period a noun *dream* also
appears but corresponding, always according to the *OED,* to 'joy, pleasure, glad-
ness, mirth, rejoicing'. A verbal form would derive from this noun meaning: 'to
play on an instrument, rejoice'. It seems to the *OED,* that the Middle and Modern
meaning of the word has nothing to do with this general concept of happiness
pointed by the Old English registered form. The possibility of a homonym verb
*dréam that could derive in the modern form is not completely denied, even though
no traces of it may have been found in written texts.

Two are the words that seem to have covered this semantic area in Old Eng-
lish. *Swefnian* 'trans. to appear to in a dream, intr. to dream' (*OED*), derived from
the neuter noun *sweven* 'sleep, dream, vision', has cognates in other Indo-European
languages such as Sanskrit *svápiti* or Latin *sopor* both related to 'sleep'. The temporal
limits of the *OED* allow for just one quot of the verb for the year 1000, and entries
for four more authors, Wyclif, Langland, Chaucer and Douglas, 1513 being the
latest date. The other verb recorded in Old English for 'to dream' is *(ge)mætan*, for
which the *OED* registers examples again from 1000 up to 1570. In this case the verb
seems to have been always impersonal, or at least presenting the "dreamer" in dative/
accusative and if with a "dream", this one in nominative: "me mette: it occurred to
me in a dream; I dreamt" or "me mette sweven, I dreamt a dream" (*OED*, s.v.).

Moving from the historical dictionary to more specialized works in Old
English, the Bosworth and Toller's *Anglo-Saxon Dictionary* (*BT*) (1973) includes
two different meanings of *swefnian* depending on the case of the noun that it ac-
companies: if with accusative of person, "to appear in a dream to a person", if with
nominative of person, "to dream". *Mætan*, is also defined as "to dream (with dat. or
acc. of person; cf. Icel. dreyma which takes acc. of dreamer and of dream)"; for
gemætan, it says "v. Impers. acc. To dream, somniare, somnium videre". The verb
dreman, with the variants *dryman* and *driman,* is defined as "to rejoice, to play on an
instrument; jubilare, psallere", "to rejoice, be joyful, jubilare" and "to make a joyous
sound with voice or with instrument, to rejoice" if intransitive, and "to sing a song"
if transitive. Hall's concise *Anglo-Saxon Dictionary* (*H*) (1996) presents *dryman* as
"to sing aloud, rejoice" and *swefnian* as "(w. nom. pers.) *to dream, Lcd:* (+) (w. acc.
pers.) *appear in a dream*". The *Thesaurus of Old English* (*TOE*) (1995) sets *swefnian*

and *mætan* within the general concept of "0.2. Life and Death" which is down-graded to: "0.2.05. Sensation, perception, feeling", "0.2.0.5.0.4. Sleepiness, drowsiness, sleep" and finally included in "02.05.04.02 A dream" and defined as "to dream". In the case of *dryman,* it appears in group "8. Emotion" and specifically under the heading "08.01.01.03.07. Joyous sound, mirth" and defined as "To rejoice, make a joyous sound". It is also included within the concept of "18. Leisure", "18.02.07.01 Singing, song" and "To sing (a song)".

In spite of all these data, a first reading of O.E. *dryman* is compelled to a wrong interpretation. Its fake "transparency" leads to a sometimes-odd translation, and if further checked to an obscure etymology of *dream.* In the case of the *TOE*, without using the alphabetical index, one would hardly take as a first choice a semantic field related to the concept of emotion for *dryman.* Even contemporary dictionaries like *Collins* (1995, updated edition) include as the etymology of modern *dream,* the Old English form for "to rejoice".

The proposal for a modern Functional Lexematic Old English Dictionary (FLOED, see n.1) could contribute to facilitate the work of the modern reader who tends to be trapped in the false-friend net of forms and concepts but, furthermore, it could also contribute to explain the reasons for such initial "confusion".

2. LEXICAL DOMAINS

The Functional Lexematic Model intends to establish a correlation between the semantics and syntax of lexical units. In the case of verbs this relationship is also perceptible in their division in lexical domains. The establishment of lexical domains as proposed by Faber and Mairal Usón (1999), based in its turn on the Functional Grammar (FG) (Dik 1989[1], 97[2]) method of the *Stepwise Lexical Decomposition* (Dik 1978*),* is a means for a new classification which does not stand on pre-established concepts. It tries to be sustained in the common factor that appears in the definition of those words. Lexical domains are based on definitional analysis and the sharing of the same *genus,* the "superordinate term of the domain or subdomain by means of which the other lexemes are directly or indirectly defined" (Faber and Mairal (1999:59*).* To go further in the semantic representation of verbs the Functional Lexematic Old English Dictionary project (Cortés & Mairal, forthcoming) complements this theory with the lexical representations proposed by the Role and Reference Grammar (RRG) which seem more adequate for acquainting "on those aspects of the meaning of a word that explains the syntactic behavior and the set of alternations that a lexical word has" (Cortés Rodríguez & Pérez Quintero 2001).[2]

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[2] For a more detailed explanation of the integration of both, FG and RRG, perspectives see Cortés Rodríguez and Pérez Quintero.

From this point of view and attending the definitions given for *swefnian* and *mætan* in historical dictionaries, the genus they share is "to dream", which in turn is defined in modern dictionaries as:

– *Concise Oxford English Dictionary*: "have visions etc. (as) in sleep"
– *Collins* "To undergo or experience (a dream or dreams)" The noun is defined as "Mental activity usually in the form of imagined series of events occuring during certain fases of sleep"
– *Collins Cobuild*: "When you **dream,** 2.1 you see imaginary pictures and events in your mind while you are asleep [...] 2.2 you think about a particular situation or event you would very much like to happen, but which you know is probably not possible"
– *Longman Lexicon of Contemporary English:* BODILY STATES: B82 vbs.
Sleeping and waking
"to imagine (events, pictures, etc.) while asleep"

According to the definitions of *swefnian* and *mætan* and the functional lexematic perspective, these verbs could form part of the domain of COGNITION, since the shared element seems to be "imagine". Following the classification of Faber and Mairal for modern verbs:[3]

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7. COGNITION [know]
7.1. To become aware of sth. (having it) in one's mind [know]
7.2. To use one's mind to become more aware of sth. In a certain way [think about]
7.3. To use one's mind to form an opinion/idea [think (of)]
(...)
7.3.7. To think (of) sth., forming it in one's mind as an idea/picture [imagine]
-*swefnian*: to dream, to have visions and imaginary sense impressions in sleep.
-*mætan:* to dream

Even though we could establish that the concept of dream falls within the subdomain of "imagine", it seems incomplete since the verb could also participate of other domains like visual PERCEPTION. This interconnection will be retaken in the next sections.

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[3] Not until the completion of the project of a Functional Lexematic Dictionary of Old English, will be possible to assert if this classification is completely valid for Old English verbs or if it will require further modifications.

The classification offers, nevertheless, further problems like the establishment of superodinate terms and their hyponyms. The definitions offered by specialized dictionaries in Old English, on which we should rely to find a *genus*, are quite often glosses, that is a direct translation to a Modern English word and not a real definition. Such is the case for *swefnian* and *mætan* whose *genus* coincides in "to dream". It is at this point when the syntactic and paradigmatic information of the verbs may help, not only to clarify the concept as conceived by Old English speakers (if it is possible to reach that), but to establish a hyperonym. Such data can only be observed directly in sentences where these verbs occur. The *Old English Corpus* of the University of Toronto (*OEC*) offers the material necessary to draw some conclusions.[4]

Initially, the *OEC* corroborates the information given by *BT*, that is, in the case of *mætan* we are in front of one of those verbs traditionally called "impersonal", while *swefnian* presents both a transitive and an impersonal construction. In a Modern English translation of these verbs, meaning is conveyed from the perspective of the experiencing entity which would be represented as the (x) variable in RRG's terms. Their first argument would be attributed to the human with the semantic macrorole of "actor" even though it appears in dative case, the person is the one who creates the image of the dream in his mind, he/she dreams. The second argument (y), even though codified in nominative or accusative, would be the "undergoer" of the *Aktionsart* of the verb.[5] It should be stated that sometimes the case cannot be clearly determined since we are dealing with neuter nouns (*swefen*), invariable pronouns or with no distinguishable form (*man, hwæt*), or propositions (normally introduced by *þæt*). Nevertheless, this perspective implies a lack of coincidence between case and semantic function with impersonal *swefnian* and *mætan*, what may be due to a transposition of our modern understanding of the verb. Several proposals and interpretations have tried to explain these constructions being more respectful with syntax (Fischer and Van Der Leek 1982, Anderson 1985, Allen 1986, Lass 1994). Our analysis of the examples obtained from the *OEC* show the predicate frames summarized in the tables bellow:

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[4] *The Old English Corpus in Machine-Readable Form* is the result of the compilation of a "complete record of surviving Old English except for some variant manuscripts of individual texts". The number of texts included is 3037, offering possibilities of access to specific roots of words, complete words, or related groups of words. Our use of the *OEC* has been done through the page http://ets.umich.edu/o/oec/html, quotations follow the conventions and Cameron numbers used by the Corpus.

[5] Semantic macroroles, actor and undergoer, subsume "a number of specific argument-types (thematic relations). The generalized agent-type role will be termed actor and the generalized patient-type role will be called undergoer." (Van Valin & LaPolla 1997:141). RRG distinguishes *Aktionsart*, as inherent temporal properties of verbs, from *states of affairs*, those properties the verb has in a particular clause. There are five basic *Aktionsarts* plus their causative counterparts: state, activity, achievement, accomplishment and active accomplishment. These predicate classes can be determined by means of linguistic tests which are not completely operative in O.E. For futher reference on RRG see Van Valin & LaPolla 1997.

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swefnian: w.v., p. -ode

1)

      swefnian (**x** <+anim.+ prot. human>) , ((**y**<-anim, -prot. human>))

                                                  where: (x) Nom., (y) Acc.

e.g.:

– <u>Ic</u> slep & swefnode & ic aras forþam drihten anfeng me *Ego dormiui et soporatus sum et exurrexi quia dominus suscepti me.* **PsGIK (Sisam)** C7.13 [0016 (3.6)]
– *Si somniaueris te duas lunas uidere gaudium & le titiam significat* gif þu swefnast <u>þe twege monan geseon</u> gefean & blisse getacnaþ **ProgGl 1 (Först)** C16.1 [0272(271)]
– *Luna x quicquid somniaueris, nullum effectum malyum habet* <u>swahswætswa þe swefn<u>ast</u></u> nane gefremminge yfele hæf ð **ProgGI 3(Först)** C16.3 [0010(10)]

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2)

      swefnian (**x** <-prot. human - anim.>), (**y** <+anim. +prot. human>)

                                             Where (x) Nom. (y) Dat.

e.g.:

– *Quidquid somniauerit, in gaudium conuerteur, quia neque malum, raro bonum significat* <u>swaswætswa</u> <u>hine</u> swefnað, on blisse hit bið gewyrfed, forþi ne yfel, seldan go hit getacnað. **ProgGl 2 (Först)** C16.2 [00 06 (1.8)]
– Hu magon we swa dygle, drihten, ahicgan on sefan þinne, hu <u>ðe</u> swefnede, oððe wyrda gesceaft wisdom bude, gif þu his ærest ne meaht or areccan? **Dan** A1.3 [0037 (127)]

(ge-) mætan: w.v., p. -te

      Mætan (**x** <-prot. human - anim.>), (**y**<+anim. +prot. Human>)

                                               Where: (x) Nom., (y) Dat.

e.g.:

– GYF ænig witega arise betwynan eow, and secge ðæat <u>hine</u> mæte <u>swefen</u>, [...] **Deut** B8.14.5 [0140 (13.1)]
– Gyf him mæte, <u>þæt he sweord wege</u>, orsorhnesse yfela þæt bioþ. **Pro 3.10 (Först)** B23.3.3.10 [0004(4)]
– Ic swefna cyst secgan wylle,<hwæt><u>me</u> gemætte to midre nihte, syðþan reordberend reste wunedon. **Dream A2.5** [0002 (1)]

       It is not our intention here to theorize about impersonal constructions in Old English, but just deal with the semantic space for 'to dream' in this historical period. Even so, we cannot avoid what seems to be the nature of these verbs. According to Fischer and Van Der Leek (1983: 353) in the case of *swefnian* we would be in front of a mainly "experiencer-subject construction", the one exemplified in table 1. Nevertheless, there are examples that indicate the verb also behaves as a type ii "cause-

experiencer" (in terms of the mentioned authors), where the "cause" appears in Nom. and the "experiencer" in Dat. (table 2). For *mætan* only this second possibility seems to work.[6] In terms of RRG we would be dealing with an inanimate EFFECTOR that produces in the asleep human a visual perception (Van Valin & LaPolla 1997:122). From this point of view, the EFFECTOR concords with the verbal ending, the nominative case is suitable to codify it, and the dative applies to the EXPERIENCER. To support this interpretation it is also found that in the examples where *mætan* occurs it describes a situation where the human is not in control, visions appear in his/her mind as something external to his/her own person and they need to be interpreted. Unlike in modern psychology, dreams do not emerge from the unconscious of the person, they seem to come from the outside as advice from God or external premonitions but they are not understood as imagined/created by the person.

The situation of *swefnian* is different allowing for both constructions. One in which a first argument is the human, with the semantic macrorole of actor, appearing in nominative, and another where the human is second argument with the semantic macrorole of undergoer (resembling *mætan*) and, therefore, codified as Dat. or Acc. A possible coexistence of both constructions could be exemplified in the third sentence presented in table 2: *Luna x quicquid somniaueris, nullum effectum malyum habet* swahswætswa þe swefnast nane gefremminge yfele hæfð **ProgGI 3(Först) C16.3 [0010(10)]**.

This indicates that our first classification in domains might be wrong. Attending to the genus of the given definitions, both *mætan* and *swefnian* would be within the domain of COGNITION; their logical structures reveal, nevertheless, a possible difference. Whereas *swefnian* could be set in this domain since it involves the activity of 'imagining while asleep', 'dream', in the case of *mætan* it is closer to the domain of physical PERCEPTION, since it is the vision the one that causes the perception in the mind of the sleeper. Therefore, *swefnian* has a wider meaning and would act as the hyperonym in the domain of COGNITION, but in the domain of PERCEPTION it would be *mætan* the one to occupy the higher position.

The need to include such perspective may justify the fact that s*wefnian* has been defined as "to dream" or "to appear in a dream to". Curiously enough, *mætan* has only been defined as "to dream", this may obey to its presenting a single type of construction and the interest in giving an easy translation. In spite of that, it should also be taken into account that the *OEC* shows the existence of more examples for *mætan* than for *swefnian*. The first form (a verb from which a deverbal noun, *mæting,* is found) presents a range of more than forty matches. For *swefnian* we only find nine matches, highly superseded by the number of occurrence of the noun from which this verb derives, *swefn* (a 'dream'*).* The cases where we deal with the verb

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[6] It seems that to Fischer and Van Der Leek (1983: n.8), *swefnian* and *mætan* belong to type i, impersonals, where there would be no grammatical subject.

swefnian are glosses for Latin *somnio* and a sentence from *MS. Daniel.* It is also revealing the fact that *mætan* appears quite often combined with the noun *swefn*, a noun that also keeps company with the verb *seon,* 'to see':

– Oðer swefen hyne mætte, & he rehte ... **Gen B8.14.1 [0751(37.9)]**
– [...] hwæðer me on sæfne mæte eall þæt ic her geseo færlices wundres? **LS 34 (Seven Sleepers) B3.3.18.2 [0120(4759]**
– Witoðlice hit gelamp þæt him gemætte an swefen ... **Gen (Ker) B8.1.2**
– Heo wearð þa on slæpe and on swefne geseah... **ÆLS (Agnes) B1 3.8 [0101(272)**
– Ða geseah he on swefne ... **Dan A1.3 [0005(174.11)]**
– On þære ylcan nihte he geseah on swefne ... **ÆLS (Martin) B1.3.30 [0018(75)]**

The relationship of these verbs might point to a further domain interaction that will be proposed in the next section.

3. LEXICAL DOMAINS INTERACTION

domain interrelationships are multiple and various, each domain can be said to have a set of secondary connections as well. These secondary connections are evident, for example, in the double domain membership of certain verbs in which one set of meaning components or another is highlighted, depending on its location (Faber and Mairal 1999: 251)

When including *swefnian* and *mætan* within the domain of COGNITION, the genus "dream" was used as central. Logical structures revealed that they should also be included in PHYSICAL PERCEPTION when expressing the idea of 'appear, become a dream perceptible to'. Such interrelation shows when attending to general definitions of "dream" like the one given by the *OED* "to have visions and imaginary sense-impressions in sleep". This might also be supported by the combination of the verb *seon* and the noun *swefen*, more frequent than the verb *swefnian*. Thus, we can see how COGNITION or MENTAL PERCEPTION is related with visual perception (Faber and Mairal, 1999:295) as in "to become aware of something in one's mind as though one is seeing it [see]".[7] When referring to the COGNITION verbs *consider,contemplate, meditate,* and *ponder*, Faber and Mairal (1999: 230) state that:

Even though these verbs belong to the domain of COGNITION, they are not prototypical verbs of this domain because their behaviour is more similar to that of verbs of VISUAL PERCEPTION. Not surprisingly, *consider, contemplate, meditate,* and

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[7] Once more we refer to Faber and Mairal (1999) presentation of domains for Modern English bearing in mind possible changes for a future FLOED.

ponder are predicates with double domain membership. All of them have at least one sense that designates a type of visual perception when their goal argument is a first-order entity.

The type of argumentation presented by *mætan* and *swefnian* seems to point to verbs of PERCEPTION, something implicit in historical dictionaries definitions like "somnium videre" or "appear in a dream". From our modern referents we are emphasizing the idea of the human agent but it could also be that, from the Old English perspective, the underlined entity is the one that has been usually marked as goal, the vision that spontaneously appears to a prototypical human entity who experiences it. The fact that this vision is not a "real" first-order entity, but a third-order entity perceived as a first one might be explained by a metaphorical mapping.[8] Cognitive Semantics establishes that one of our ways to categorize reality is through Image Schematic Models which:

> specify schematic images, such as trajectories or long, thin shapes of containers. Our knowledge about baseball pitches includes a trajectory schema. Our knowledge about candles includes a long, thin object schema. (Lakoff 1987:113-114)

Another possibility is to effectuate that categorization by means of Metaphoric Models, projecting an "image schematic model in one domain to a corresponding structure in another domain" (114).

VISUAL PERCEPTION is an image schema which according to Faber and Mairal (1999:263) might be based on a maintained Pythagorean theory from which we still understand the phenomenon of vision as the trajectorial emission of an invissible light by the eyes that enables the perceiver to distinguish forms and colours. When trying to apprehend something so abstract as a to be called *a vision,* even though not perceived with the eyes but the mind, a metaphorical mapping is required. To understand a mental image we put it in terms of perceiving with the eyes, even with the contradiction of being, at the same time, asleep. What we have translated as "to dream", according to our modern understanding of that reality, might have been in a different stage of apprehension reached through an Image Schematic Model as VISUAL PERCEPTION. This would also explain why the noun *swefen* usually translated as "a dream", appears so often combined with the verb *seon.* This assertion could be against Faber and Mairal (1999:264) proposal that vision has been traditionally conceptualized in pre-Socratic terms:

> In this type of folk model, the perceived entity is affected in some way by the perceiver. Instead of the role of experiencer, the first argument assumes the role of

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8 Faber and Mairal (1999:40) define first order entity as a "physical object that can be located in space and time" and third order entity "abstract entities outside space and time, which can be asserted in terms of their truth."

an agent, who actually does something to the object [...] Needless to say, the scientific model of visual perception is very different from that encoded in our language

This is not the case of the mapping of *mætan* and *swefen* onto VISUAL PERCEPTION. What seems to dominate here is right the opposite, it is the vision the one that assumes the role EFFECTOR, and the traditional agent, the human being, is only an EXPERIENCER codified through dative or accusative.

From this angle, we can offer the following logical structures for the verbs of dreaming in Old English:

Swefnian: "to imagine while asleep, to dream"

$$\textbf{do}\text{' (x [}\textbf{dream}\text{' (x) or (x, (y))])}$$

– Ic slep and swefnode...
– ...gif þu swefnast þe twege monan geseon

Swefnian and *mætan*: "to appear, become a dream perceptible to"

$$\textbf{do}\text{' (x[}\textbf{appear}\text{'(x)]) \& [}\textsc{become } \textbf{perceptible}\text{' (x, y)]}$$

where x=swefn
y= experiencer

– swaswætswa hine swefnað...
– ...and secge ðæt hine mæte swefen

Therefore we are facing two different *Aktionsarts* for *swefnian*, an activity and an active accomplishmen, and only the latter for *mætan.* In the first case the activity represented trough the variable **do**', points to the fact of dreaming as an activity performed by a dreamer, ACTOR, and a possible dream as UNDERGOER. In the *Aktionsart* shared by *swefnian* and *mætan*, what we have is the combination of the "appearing of the dream" and the "becoming itself perceptive to the EXPERIENCER" (see note 5).

4. OLD AND MODERN DREAM

At this stage, the question of the relationship of the concept covered by *swefen* and *mætan* with that of the old and modern *dream* can be retaken. According to Ayto (1990 s.v.):

Semantically, the two are quite long way apart, and on balance it seems more likely that Old English had a homonym **dream* 'dream', which has not survived in the written records, and which was perhaps subsequently reinforced by Old Norse *draumr.* Both these and the related German *traum* and Dutch *droom* have been traced back

to an Indo-European base denoting 'deception', represented also in Sanskrit *druh-* 'seek to harm' and Avestan (a dialect of Old Iranian) *druz-* 'lie, deceive'.

Hughes (2000:99) seems more explicit when he says "Anglo-Saxon *dream* meant 'joy, revelry' but took on the sense of 'dream' under the semantic influence of Old Norse *draumur,* which had that meaning". To what extent the two *dreams,* the old and the modern, are far apart as pointed by Ayto is something that could be questioned, but it is not stated clearly in any of the dictionaries mentioned in this paper. Even though etymologically they could be just homonyms, the clear acceptance of one meaning and the nearly complete disappearance of the other could imply a certain relation. This seems to be reinforced by the transitional coexistence of the two verbs, *swefnian* and *dryman,* during the Middle English period, in their evolved forms *sweven* and *drem/dream.* In a text like the alliterative poem *Morte Arthure* attributed to Huchown of the Awle Ryale and dating from the second half of the 14th century we find lines like these (Mossé 1952, 255, *1s759-760)*:

> And with þe swoghe of þe see he fell in swefnynge.
> Hym dremyd of a dragon, dredfull to beholde, [...]
> Thane come of þe Oryente ewyn hym agaynez
> A blake bustous bere abwen in the clowdes

This Scottish author draws part of the information to elaborate his poem from an earlier Latin text by Geoffrey Monmouth, *Historia Regum Britanniae,* of which Mossé gives the corresponding chapter:

> Dum autem innumeris navibus circumseptus prospero cursu et cum gaudio altum secaret, quasi media hora noctis instante, gravissimus somnus eum intercepit. Sopitus etiam per somnus vidit ursum quendam in aere volantem [...] terribilem quoque draconem ab occidente advolare

Monmouth's text provided Huchown with the cognate word for *swefnian*, "sopitus" and also the related "somnus", but he only uses "swefnynge",[9] a deverbal noun from *swefnian,* and seems to prefer "dremyd" instead of a possible *swefnode,* no doubt for the sake of alliteration. Still the coexistence of the two verbs allows him to use both in two consecutive lines and without any fear of not conveying the desired meaning.

The usual lexicographical presentation of these verbs is what seems to have set them so apart. Nevertheless, their actual connection lies on the secondary domains with which these two verbs are involved. According to its definitions (see Introduction) and genus *dreman* would be classified as follows:

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[9] This is essentially a Northern dialect text where the *-ing* endings still maintain the character of suffix to form nouns from verbs rather than its use to form present participles substituting the *-ande, -ende* endings as it was happening in the Southern dialects.

8. FEELING (to become aware of sth. Other than by sight, having a sensation)
    8.1. To feel bad [suffer]

    ...
    8.2. To feel sth. good [enjoy]
    8.3. To feel sadness [grieve]

    ...
    8.4. To feel happiness [delight in, thrill, rejoice]
        dreman

        As in the previous cases, the verb could also be included in other domains like SOUND, ACTION. The interrelation of the later and FEELING may indicate a connection with *mætan* and *swefnian,* their relation with FEELING has to do with the sensations conveyed by having a dream. Finally, though there are waking-dreams, the state for dreaming is sleep or dormant, inactive state and therefore we can include the verbs in the domain of ACTION. In syntactic terms and according to the *OEC* examples, *dreman* could be represented as follows:

dreman,driman,dryman: wk.v., p. - de; pp.-ed

"To rejoice, to play an instrument"
(x: <+anim.+ Prot. human>) $_{Exp}$ (y) $_{stimulus}$

                      where x=Nom.
                            y=Dat.

– *Exaltare domine in uertute tua; cantabimus et psallemus uirtutes tuas* upahefe drihten on mægene þinum <u>we</u> singað & ðrymad mægenu þine. **PsGHI (Campbell) C7.6 [0261 (20.14)]**
– We ofþriccan ansyne his on andetnesse & on sealmum we driman <u>him</u> *Preoccupemus faciem eius in confessione et in salmis iubilemus ei.* **PsGIJ (Oess) C7. 5 [1516 (94.2)]**
– Drimaþ <u>drihtne</u> ealle eorþe singaþ & blissiaþ & singaþ. *Iubilate domino omnis terra cantate et exultate et psallite.* **PsGIJ (Oess) C7.5 [1554 (97.4)]**

        The logical structure presents a first argument in nominative who is the EXPERIENCER of that feeling activated by an STIMULUS which usually appears in dative resembling the Latin version in those many cases when it appears as a gloss of *psallio.* In this case and when understood as 'rejoice' the *Aktionsart* of the verb is a state: **rejoice**' (x) or (x,y).
        Conforming to what others have said before, the examples do not show any clear resemblance of this *dreman* with *dream*. Even so, contrasting their lexicographical representations not only shows the differences and similarities of the O.E. verbs, but it also facilitates the understanding of the inclusion of the Old Norse *draumur* in the core lexicon of English. The *OED* points that this Norse verb was also an impersonal one, therefore coinciding with *mætan*. The correspondance in form with the O.E. 'rejoice' may have enriched the "meaning" of the verb. The O.E. verbs for 'to dream'

do not seem to present a mark for specifying dreaming has to be good as compared to having a nightmare, a conception that is later in time, Ayto (1990: s.v.) says:

> the mare of nightmare is not the same word as *mare* 'female horse'. It comes from Old English *ma?re,* which denoted a sort of evil spirit or goblin which sat on sleepers' chests and gave them bad dreams. That is what the compound meant too when it emerged in the early M.E. period, and the metaphorical application to the bad dream supposedly caused by this incubus is not recorded until the mid l6thC.

The *Thesaurus* also registers in 0.2.0.5.04.0.2 [...] A nightmare: "elf/ælfadl, ælfsiden, egesgrima, mære/mare, unswefn". In the light of Ayto's definition all these seem self-explaining, related to *elfs, spirits, goblins,* the first three and "mære", and to a *bad-vision* "eges-grima" and "unswfen".

It is likely then, as Hughes suggests, that the Norse *draumur* somehow incorporated or stressed the possitive quality of the O.E. *dreman* 'rejoice' and also the possibility of doing it while awake. The later, Middle English borrowing from Latin, *vision* and the consolidation of *nightmare* provided a contrast. This inclusion of "to dream" in the domain of FEELING GOOD is the one that allows for modern expressions which imply a positive sense of dreaming:

– He dreamed of having a car (*Collins Cobuild*)
– When you are young you dream of all sorts of things (*Collins Cobuild*)
– The soldier often dreamt of/about home (*Oxford Advanced Learner's*)
– I certainly didn´t promise you £ 100; you must have dreamt it (*Oxford Advanced Learner's*)
– "somewhere over the rainbow, sky above, there's a place that I dreamt of once in a lullaby"

There is also an extension to the noun, a dream is more than a simple vision, it is quite often a possitive vision, something pleasant or that you wish to happen. We can see it in examples and expressions like:

– The search after the great is the dream of youth (Emerson, quoted in the *OED s.v.*)
– His dream of becoming President has come true (*Collins Cobuild*)
– American dream: "the notion that the American social, economic, and political system makes success possible for every individual" (*Collins updated ed.*).

The final results of this, obviously limited, research point to clear differences in the basic semantic spaces covered by the Old English verbs for "to dream" and their modern counterpart. However, in the case of the Old English *dream* and the Modern English *dream* the distance between them seems to have been enlarged by the work of lexicography . Though originally they expressed different contents and in different ways, there is a point in their history where they meet thanks to the cross-domains they belonged to. When the Anglo-Saxons dreamt, they were happy; when visions presented to then while asleep, they had premotions of good or evil. Their legacy allowed us to have "dreams of joy".

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