Scientific activity as an interpretative practice. Empiricism, constructivism and pragmatism

Abstract

Since the publication of The Scientifi c Image and earlier works Bas C. van Fraassen has defended his constructive empiricism as the most appropriate philosophical interpretation of scientifi c activity in critical open dialogue with realisms (both old and new) and instrumentalisms. A new impetus was added to the debate by the publication of his most recent book, Scientifi c Representation , in which he qualifi es some of his basic suppositions and proposes a new name for his empiricism: empiricist structuralism . In this paper I argue in line with his thesis that if philosophy of science aims to offer a specifi c view and an adequate interpretation of science, the starting point should be a recognition of the complexity of the dialectic process between theoretical construction and data generation, processing and laboratory analysis procedures; also a recognition of the central role of subjects as interpreters in designing and using scientifi c representations. I also argue that the family resemblance which exists between the constructivist/structuralist empiricism and American pragmatism suggests new avenues for analysing the decision-making process and the role played by subjects who interpret, construct or use models in scientifi c contexts. A connexion with the pragmatists’ thesis and perspective that is very much present, not only in van Fraassen’s most recent texts on scientifi c representation, as some other authors maintain, but also from the outset in his earliest publications.