RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article T1 New phenomenology and the problem of the self A1 Gonçalves, Jorge K1 ilusión del sí mismo, K1 auto-conciencia pre-reflexiva K1 sí mismo nuclear K1 primeras etapas del sí mismo AB In this article I will argue against the solution of the self problem, proposed by the new phenomenologists. Recently Metzinger, in the wake of David Hume, argues that the self is an illusion, relying on data from neurophysiology. The concept of «pre-reflective self-consciousness», presented by the phenomenologists, apparently solves the problem by removing the substantial nature of the self. However developmental psychology leads me to think that in the early stages of life there is no sense of self, even of core self. Thus the problem ofself remains, because we do not know why the feeling of self arises from conscious states PB Universidad de La Laguna. Servicio de Publicaciones SN 1132-8177 YR 2010 FD 2010 LK http://riull.ull.es/xmlui/handle/915/12750 UL http://riull.ull.es/xmlui/handle/915/12750 LA en DS Repositorio institucional de la Universidad de La Laguna RD 28-mar-2024