RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 New phenomenology and the problem of the self
A1 Gonçalves, Jorge
K1 ilusión del sí mismo,
K1 auto-conciencia pre-reflexiva
K1 sí mismo nuclear
K1 primeras etapas del sí mismo
AB In this article I will argue against the solution of the self problem, proposed by the new phenomenologists. Recently Metzinger, in the wake of David Hume, argues that the self is an illusion, relying on data from neurophysiology. The concept of «pre-reflective self-consciousness», presented by the phenomenologists, apparently solves the problem by removing the substantial nature of the self. However developmental psychology leads me to think that in the early stages of life there is no sense of self, even of core self. Thus the problem ofself remains, because we do not know why the feeling of self arises from conscious states
PB Universidad de La Laguna. Servicio de Publicaciones
SN 1132-8177
YR 2010
FD 2010
LK http://riull.ull.es/xmlui/handle/915/12750
UL http://riull.ull.es/xmlui/handle/915/12750
LA en
DS Repositorio institucional de la Universidad de La Laguna
RD 19-nov-2024